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Abstract
Environmental policymakers must address the adverse effects of a number of
pollutants that accumulate in the environment.  Goals for the regulation of these damages
often involve holding long-term emissions below a level deemed to be "dangerous,'' or
outright banning of offending products or processes along with subsidization of more "green"
alternatives.  This paper builds upon previous studies by Keeler, Spence, and Zeckhauser
(1971) and Tahvonen and Withagen (1996) in addressing the optimal long-term management
of an accumulative but assimilatable pollutant through policies that restrict more damaging
production processes and thereby induce more benign alternatives.  Using a simple general
equilibrium approach, we consider the possibility that the assimilative capacity of the
environment is diminished and eventually exhausted by pollution accumulation.  In this case
there is a nonconvexity in the problem that gives rise to multiple potential optima,
complicating the characterization of the optimal path and the determination of decentralized
policies that can support an optimal outcome.  In particular, environmental quality may be
preserved or completely degraded in the long term.  This makes the question of whether
polluting processes or products should be banned more complicated and more interesting.
We characterize the circumstances under which a banning policy is consistent with an
intertemporally optimizing path, we investigate the sensitivity of optimal solutions to the cost
of a clean backstop technology, and we discuss more generally the design of price-based and
quantity-based policies for supporting an optimal solution.
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ACCUMULATIVE POLLUTION, "CLEAN TECHNOLOGY,"
AND POLICY DESIGN
Cees Withagen and Michael A. Toman*
1.   INTRODUCTION
Environmental policymakers must address the adverse effects of a number of
pollutants that accumulate in the environment.  Examples include toxic substances like
PCBs and heavy metals, radioactive contamination, biological contaminants in water that
require time to break down, water acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion, and
accumulation of greenhouse gases.  For these substances, damages to ecological systems
and human interests depend on the concentration of pollution, and thus in turn on the
accumulation of nondegraded emissions, not just the current emissions flow.
Goals for the regulation of these damages often involve holding long-term emissions
to a level below what is believed to be "dangerous.''  This is the approach taken, for
example, in Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Sometimes "dangerous" is interpreted to be a loading within the capacity of the environment
to neutralize or otherwise assimilate damaging effects over the long term.
Rather than regulating damaging emissions, policymakers could simply ban
(immediately or after an adjustment period) the production and use of the offending
substances, if there are substitutes.  This was the approach taken for ozone-depleting
chlorofluorocarbons.  It is also implicit in, for example, policies to "virtually eliminate''
persistent pollutants in the Great Lakes (International Joint Commission (1989); see also
Foran (1991)).  Alternative goods or technologies also could be subsidized to induce a
changeover to their use.  Clearly there are relationships among these various strategies, e.g.,
high enough taxes on damaging substances will drive them out of the market and induce
substitution to more benign alternatives.  Policies which focus on "green investment'' to
bring forth substitutes in a finite period of time are attracting policy interest as possible
ways to limit environmental damage as well as rejuvenating the economic productivity of
capital stocks.
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There is a substantial academic literature concerned with optimal control of
accumulative pollutants.1  This paper builds upon previous studies by addressing the optimal
long-term management of an accumulative but assimilatable pollutant through policies that
restrict more damaging production processes and thereby induce more benign alternatives.  In
this respect we follow the simple general equilibrium approach taken by Keeler, Spence, and
Zeckhauser (1971) in their "Model II."  Unlike these authors, however, we consider the
possibility that the assimilative capacity of the environment is diminished and eventually
exhausted by pollution accumulation, following in particular the partial equilibrium analysis
of Tahvonen and Withagen (1996).  In this case there is a nonconvexity in the problem that
gives rise to multiple potential optima, complicating the characterization of the optimal path
and the determination of decentralized policies that can support an optimal outcome.2  In
particular, environmental quality may be preserved or completely degraded in the long term.
This makes the question of whether polluting processes or products should be banned more
complicated and more interesting.
In Section 2 of the paper we give the basic structure and assumptions of the model.  In
Section 3 we develop our basic results about the characterization of optimal paths for the two
different classes of pollution degradation function.  In Section 4 we consider an interesting
special case of the model with discrete technology options.  In Section 5 we consider how the
analysis informs the design of practical policies for dealing with accumulative pollutants.  In
Section 6 we offer some brief concluding remarks.
2.   THE MODEL
We use a fairly simple model of social surplus maximization in which households'
well-being depends on environmental quality as well as consumption.  Pollution occurs as a
byproduct of input utilization by competitive firms producing the consumption good.  In the
general case input proportions and thus the pollution intensity of output are variable; however,
restricting the use of the polluting input raises the opportunity cost of producing the
consumption good.  Environmental quality is related to the concentration or "stock" of
pollution.  In the absence of government policy to internalize environmental externality,
                                               
1 See, for example, Keeler, Spence, and Zeckhauser (1971); Plourde (1972); d'Arge and Kogiku (1973); Cropper
(1976); Asako (1980); Heal (1982); Becker (1982); Pethig (1991); van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991); Conrad
and Olson (1992); Falk and Mendelsohn (1993); Hoel (1993); Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1993); Tahvonen
(1995, 1996); Tahvonen and Withagen (1996); Tahvonen and Salo (1996); Weyant et al. (1996); and Toman and
Palmer (1997).  Here we use the term "optimal'' in the conventional sense to refer to intertemporal programs that
maximize the present value of social surplus.  A few studies have been concerned with other social criteria, e.g.,
maximum long-term sustainable surplus with a zero rate of time preference (e.g., Forster (1973); see also
Toman, Pezzey and Krautkraemer (1995) for further discussion and references).  In this paper we address only
present-value-maximizing programs.
2 Tahvonen and Withagen do not discuss policies for supporting an optimal path, and their formulation does not
incorporate the possibility of production with a pollution-free technology, which is one of the characteristics of
the Keeler et al. framework.Withagen and Toman RFF 98-43
3
production of the consumption good takes place with polluting means and both pollution and
environmental damage accumulate.3
We consider several forms of the pollution assimilation function.  One has the quantity
of pollution stock decay or assimilation as an increasing function of the stock of pollution.
This is a reasonable specification if one is thinking about the decay or dispersion of chemical
substances in the environment, like radioactive materials or greenhouse gas concentrations in
the environment.  The second specification assumes that degradation or assimilation
monotonically decreases as the pollution stock grows until a saturation level is reached, at
which point assimilative capacity is irreversibly lost.  This is a reasonable assumption for
pollutants whose degradation depends on biological action which can be poisoned by
pollution accumulation.4  This threshold introduces a nonconvexity, as we discuss below.5
Finally, the most general case allows for an inverted-U shape for the assimilation function,
with capacity initially rising then falling.
To formalize the presentation, we assume the economy has the capacity to produce a
homogeneous consumer commodity ( ) q  according to a technology that employs labor ( ) l  and
some other input ( ) y  , for example energy from fossil fuels, that causes pollution.  By
appropriate scaling we define the pollution flow also by  y .  The production technology is
described by a function F  with the following properties:
A1) F l y ( , ) is concave and continuously differentiable for all ( , ) l y > 0with
nonnegative partial derivatives.  Moreover  0 ) , 0 ( = y F and  0 ‡ ly F .  We treat the cases
0 ) 0 , ( = l F  and  0 ) 0 , ( > l F  separately.
                                               
3 For simplicity we do not address pollution occurring directly from product consumption or the prospects for
environmental protection through end-use measures such as recycling.
4 Hediger (1991) distinguishes between pollution assimilation and pollution degradation as follows:  if a
pollutant is nondegradable then its accumulation monotonically decreases the assimilative capacity of the
environment, whereas a degradable pollutant may have increasing then decreasing assimilative capacity as a
function of the pollution stock (i.e., an inverted U shape).  (See also Fiedler (1992) and Pezzey (1996) for a more
detailed characterization of alternative decay functions and their implications.)  We assume that our pollutant is
degradable and can be assimilated, but we distinguish between the physical properties of pollution degradation
and the bioeconomic aspects of pollution assimilation.  We assume in particular that the degradation rate either
increases or decreases with the pollution stock, while the assimilation rate monotonically decreases with the
pollution stock (this is reflected in our specification of the damage function).  We do not directly address
threshold effects in assimilation that would appear as kinks or discontinuities in the damage function (e.g., the
possibility of environmental "catastrophe'' addressed in Cropper (1976)).  However, our results can be extended
to the case of irreversible environmental damage, even when the pollutants do chemically decompose.  To see
this, let x denote the pollutant stock, let x  denote the saturation level of x, and define y by y = x if  x x £ and
x y =  if  x x > .  If we represent environmental damage as a function of y rather than x, we can capture the idea
that damage can get stuck at a high level of environmental degradation, even with pollutant decay.
5 Nonconvexity issues also are addressed in Tahvonen and Salo (1996).  They are formally dual to the problem
of optimal fisheries management with a nonconcave regeneration function (Cropper, Lee and Pannu 1979).Withagen and Toman RFF 98-43
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The stock of pollutants is denoted by x.  It accumulates according to the rate of pollution
y but there is also decay of pollution which is described by the function  A, depending on the
existing stock.  This gives the following differential equation for the stock of pollutants:
) (x A y x - = & ,   0 ) 0 ( 0 > = x x  given.  (2.1)
With respect to the decay function we make three alternative sets of assumptions:
A2.i)  
+ + ﬁ R R A:  is continuously differentiable and concave.  Furthermore,
A A x ( ) , ( ) 0 0 0 ‡ ¢ ‡  for all  0 ‡ x  and there exists y ‡ 0 such that  A y ( ) > 0.
A2.ii)  
+ + ﬁ R R A:  is continuous,  0 ) 0 ( > A , and there exists  0 > x  such that
0 ) ( = x A  for all  x x ‡ .   A is continuously differentiable and concave for  x x ‡ , with
0 ) ( £ ¢ x A .  Finally,  x x < 0 .
A2.iii)  There exists  0 > z  such that  A satisfies the conditions of A2.i for  z x £ £ 0
and the conditions of A2.ii for  x x z £ £ .
A typical representation of the decay function is given in Figure 2.1.
Instantaneous social welfare depends on consumption of the consumer commodity,
leisure and the stock of pollution.  The instantaneous welfare function is strongly separable in
these entities.  The utility attached to the consumer commodity is given by a function
U satisfying
A3.  
+ + ﬁ R R U :   is continuously differentiable on 
+ + R  and strictly concave, with
U'( ) 0 = ¥  and U'( ) ¥ = 0.
Second there is a disutility D associated with the stock of pollutants.
A4.  
+ + ﬁ R R D:  is continuously differentiable and strictly convex, with
D D ( ) '( ) 0 0 0 = =  and  D'( ) ¥ = ¥ .
We assume that leisure, which equals l l -  where l is the total amount of time
available, enters linearly into the social welfare function.  By appropriate scaling we can
attribute a utility weight of unity to leisure.6  We further assume the usual discounted
                                               
6 Note that the formulation of the social welfare function can be obtained in another way as well.  It is not
necessary to restrict attention to leisure as an argument in the welfare function.  It could as well have been
assumed that instantaneous welfare is obtained from a large set of other commodities besides the consumption
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be allocated as a bankable stock of single-use emissions permits that emitters can trade or use
as they see fit.13
This approach would provide greater dynamic efficiency in the adjustment toward a
long-term environmental target than a rigid tax, precisely because the permits market would
be able to induce more dynamically efficient adjustments in the shadow price of the pollutant
over time.14  In particular, the approach would provide reasonable long-term market signals
for the development and diffusion of clean technology.  Moreover, the quantity-based
approach would be more robust in the case of decreasing assimilative capacity.  The
Weitzman (1974) issue of price versus quantity instruments could argue in favor of a tax-
based approach with uncertain costs (see Pizer 1997 for a discussion of this in the context of
greenhouse gases), though this depends on the slope of the marginal damage function.
Moreover, issues of time consistency (Kydland and Prescott 1977) arise in attempting to
implement an intertemporal emissions trading program, but the same issues arise in
connection with any dynamic pollution control program that involves a rising shadow price of
emissions.  We therefore conclude that especially in the case of declining and uncertain
assimilative capacity, a dynamic pollution trading program warrants serious consideration as a
control strategy.
6.   CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown in this paper that the introduction of cleaner substitution possibilities
considerably complicates the dynamics of optimal accumulative pollutant control, especially
with limited assimilative capacity.  The analysis does not provide support for easy
prescriptions such as a permanent ban on polluting goods when cleaner ones are available, or
a subsidy for the cleaner good designed to achieve the same end.  The analysis instead
underscores the virtues of adapting incentive-based economic instruments to the situation
under consideration, in particular the use of dynamic quantity-based policies.
As we have noted already, an important extension of the current analysis involves
addressing optimal investment in the capacity to produce using cleaner methods.  A better
understanding of how product substitution interacts with optimal environmental remediation
policies (extending the work of Levhari and Withagen (1992)) also would be useful.  Beyond
these points, an obvious but longer-term objective is the treatment of the implications of
ecological and economic uncertainties.
                                               
13 In practice the problem is not so simple since the timing of emissions will affect interim pollutant
concentration; this approach does not ensure the achievement of a particular environmental goal by a fixed time.
14 These cost savings may be substantial, as illustrated by the analysis in Wigley, Richels and Edmonds (1996).20
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